Fibring is a general mechanism for combining logics that provides valuable insight on designing and understanding complex logical systems. To date, most research on fibring has focused on its model and proof-theoretic aspects, and on transference results for relevant metalogical properties. But we are still far from understanding in full the way mixed reasoning emerges from the logics being combined, which is preventing us from having a fully satisfactory semantics for fibred logics and, consequently, limiting the usability of the general results obtained.
Introduction
Fibring is a powerful and appealing mechanism for combining logics, a valuable tool for the construction and analysis of complex logics, and thus a key ingredient of the general theory of universal logic [3, 4] . The track of work on fibred logics has led to a substantial understanding of the semantics and proof-theory of a big class of these logics, including some general soundness and completeness preservation results (see [2, 6, 10, 17, 20, 22, 25] ). However, little is known about the mechanics of the emergence of mixed reasoning in combined logics, which is keeping us far from having a satisfactory grasp on the model-theory of fibring that may have a real impact on applications.
Recently, we have presented a first effective characterization of mixed reasoning in terms of the component logics, for the case of disjoint fibring and taking only variables as hypotheses (see [16] ). Of course, such a result is highly insufficient. Though important, disjoint fibring is only a special case of the combination mechanism, and variables are the simplest possible formulas we can think of. Still, the result immediately proved to have very interesting applications, and allowed us to obtain a newly found decidability preservation result for the theoremhood problem in disjointly fibred logics. Thus, extending this characterization is certainly bound to pay off.
Despite the fact that fibring becomes much more interesting (and difficult) when the logics being combined have some connectives in common, we see our results in this paper as an essential step towards more ambitious goals. Concretely, we shall not be able to drop the disjointness requirement, but instead the main result we obtain here is an extension of our previous characterization of mixed reasoning for disjoint fibring to arbitrary non-mixed hypotheses. While this may seem a small step, as the characterization still cannot cover reasoning from mixed hypotheses, the result is far from trivial, and indeed proves to be extremely useful. As an illustration of the power and usefulness of our main result, we shall consider two applications: a study of the conservativity problem for disjoint fibring, and a negative result about the preservation of finite-(N)valuedness by fibring.
As first proposed by Dov Gabbay in [12, 14] , given two logics L 1 and L 2 , fibring should combine L 1 and L 2 into the smallest logical system for the combined language which is a conservative extension of both L 1 and L 2 . However, it is not hard to see that a conservative extension of two given logics may not always exist. Still, this circumstance does not necessarily imply that the construction is meaningless, as one can then aim at being "as conservative as possible". This idea has led the community to understand the fibring operation as yielding the smallest logic that extends L 1 and L 2 , without worrying about conservativity [9] , a question that was mostly put aside. For some time, the only general result on the subject was a general proof of the conservativity of fusion (fibring) of modal logics [23] , which used ideas from modal semantics that could not be easily generalized. Particular forms of failure of conservativity, known as the collapsing problem were also studied in [13, 8, 21, 11] . However, if one considers the problem in full generality, it is immediate that a complete characterization of conservativity for fibred logics is far from obvious, even more so when the logics at hand share some of their connectives (which is nevertheless the case of fusion). More recently, a partial result about the conservativity of logics obtained by disjoint fibring was obtained in [19] , covering only non-trivial component logics without quasi-theorems (strongly determined logics, in the author's terminology). Using our main result, we shall obtain a complete characterization of the conservativity problem for disjoint fibring, thus extending the result of [19] .
As we already mentioned, there have been various attempts to provide fibring with an appropriate semantical counterpart. Despite some interesting results, like sufficient conditions for completeness preservation, these attempts are not fully satisfactory and, in particular, have reduced practical use. In another application of our main characterization result, we try to shed some light on why this is the case, using a common definition of model, based on the widely accepted notion of logical matrix [24] or, even more generally, of non-deterministic matrix [1] . We prove that even when given two logics that are each characterized by a finite model, their fibring may not be characterizable by a finite model. The fact that finite-(N)valuedness is not preserved by fibring is a good illustration of the difficulties behind fibred semantics.
In Section 2, we recall the notions and basic results needed throughout the paper, namely about fibred logics. With a few exceptions, the presentation follows closely [16] , of which this paper can be seen as a natural successor. In Section 3, we introduce some useful notation to deal with mixed formulas, and then motivate and obtain our key technical result (Proposition 3.12) characterizing mixed reasoning from non-mixed hypotheses in logics obtained by disjoint fibring. Sections 4 and 5 present meaningful applications of this result. Section 4 is devoted to the conservativity problem for fibred logics, and provides a full characterization result for the case of disjoint fibring (Theorem 4.4), summarized in Figure 1 . Section 5 studies the (non-)preservation of finite-(N)valuedness by fibring (Corollary 5.3). We conclude, in Section 6, with an assessment of the results obtained and paths to pursue in future work.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall the essential concepts that we are dealing with in this paper, and introduce some useful notions and notations.
Note that when η is a limit ordinal, a η-sequence does not have a last element. On the contrary, if η is a successor ordinal, and in particular a finite ordinal, then a η-sequence a can be understood as a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a η−1 , and may also be represented by a κ κ≤η−1 . The 0-sequence (empty sequence) is simply not represented.
Syntax
A signature is a N 0 -indexed family Σ = {Σ (n) } n∈N0 of sets. The elements of Σ (n) are dubbed n-place connectives. Being indexed families of sets, the usual set-theoretic notions can be smoothly extended to signatures. We will sometimes abuse notation, and confuse Σ with the set ( n∈N0 Σ (n) ) of all its connectives, and write c ∈ Σ when c is some n-place connective and c ∈ Σ (n) . For this reason, the empty signature, with no connectives at all, will be simply denoted by ∅.
Let Σ, Σ be two signatures. We say that Σ is a subsignature of Σ , and write Σ ⊆ Σ , whenever Σ (n) ⊆ Σ (n) for every n ∈ N 0 . Expectedly, we can also define
and difference Σ \ Σ = {Σ (n) \ Σ (n) } n∈N0 of signatures. Clearly, Σ ∩ Σ is the largest subsignature of both Σ and Σ , and contains the connectives shared by Σ 1 and Σ 2 . When there are no shared connectives we have that Σ ∩ Σ = ∅. Analogously, Σ ∪ Σ is the smallest signature that has both Σ and Σ as subsignatures, and features all the connectives from both Σ and Σ in a combined signature. Furthermore, Σ \ Σ is the largest subsignature of Σ which does not share any connectives with Σ.
Given a signature Σ and a set P of variables, the generated set of formulas is the carrier set L Σ (P ) of the free Σ-algebra generated by P . For simplicity, given ⊕ ∈ Σ (2) , n ∈ N and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ L Σ (P ), we shall often write ϕ 1 ⊕ ϕ 2 instead of ⊕(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ), and also
In the sequel, we shall assume that signatures are countable and sets of variables are denumerable. We assume fixed a denumerable set P of variables. If Σ is a countable signature then L Σ (P ) is clearly denumerable.
If ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ) then we define the head of ϕ to be either head(ϕ) = p when
We also define the set of variables occurring in ϕ to be either var(ϕ) = {p} when ϕ = p ∈ P , or var(ϕ) = n i=1 var(ϕ n ) when ϕ = c(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ L Σ (P ) and c ∈ Σ (n) . We extend the notation to sets of formulas in the obvious way.
Let Σ ⊆ Σ and P ⊆ P . A Σ -substitution is a function σ : P → L Σ (P ), which extends freely to a function σ :
is the instance of ϕ by σ, sometimes denoted simply by ϕ σ , and is the result of uniformly replacing each variable p ∈ P occurring in ϕ by σ(p). When Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ) we use Γ σ to denote {ϕ σ : ϕ ∈ Γ}.
Logical consequence
A logic (over signature Σ) is a tuple L = Σ, , where : 2
is a consequence operator (see [24] , for instance), that is, it satisfies the following properties:
for every Γ, ∆ ⊆ L Σ (P ) and σ : P → L Σ (P ). Note that we do not require, in general, that the logic is finitary, i.e., it may happen that Γ properly contains the union of all Γ 0 for finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ. Meaningful examples of logics that will be used throughout the paper will be presented below.
As usual, we shall confuse the consequence operator with its induced Tarskian consequence relation. Thus, given ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ), we will write Γ ϕ whenever ϕ ∈ Γ . When Γ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } is finite we write ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ϕ instead of {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } ϕ. Moreover, as usual, if Γ = ∅ we write ϕ instead of ∅ ϕ, and dub ϕ a theorem of L. A formula ϕ that is not a theorem of L but such that ψ ϕ for every ψ ∈ L Σ (P ) is dubbed a quasi-theorem, or simply a q-theorem. Clearly, ϕ is a q-theorem of L provided that ϕ but p ϕ for some p ∈ P that does not occur in ϕ. It is immediate that a logic cannot both have theorems and q-theorems.
We shall call any Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ) such that Γ = Γ a theory of L, and denote the set of all theories of L by Th(L). It is well known that Th(L) constitutes a complete lattice under the inclusion ordering (see [24] , for instance). The bottom theory of the lattice is ∅ , whereas the top theory is L Σ (P ), also called the inconsistent theory. When Γ is inconsistent we say that Γ is -explosive.
A logic L = Σ, is said to be consistent if ∅ = L Σ (P ). Clearly, L is inconsistent (not consistent) precisely when p for some p ∈ P , or alternatively when
Of course, all inconsistent logics are trivial. Moreover, easily, a trivial logic is consistent if and only if it has a q-theorem, if and only if all formulas are q-theorems, if and only if it has no theorems.
We say that a logic L = Σ , extends L = Σ, if Σ ⊆ Σ , and ⊆ , in the sense that
It is perhaps more common to express these properties in terms of the induced consequence relations. Clearly, L extends L when Γ ϕ implies Γ ϕ for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L Σ (P ). Furthermore, the extension is conservative precisely when Γ ϕ if and only if Γ ϕ. Given a signature Σ, it is well known that the set of all logics over Σ, Log(Σ), constitutes a complete lattice under the extension ordering defined above (see [24] , for instance).
For every Σ ⊆ Σ and P ⊆ P there is a natural (conservative) extension
It is not hard to see that this extension is still a Tarksian consequence relation. The next lemma, which will be useful later on, sheds some light on what happens in proofs in such (non-trivial) extended logics when none of the hypotheses has its head in Σ.
By structurality of we conclude that Γ σ ϕ σ . Assume now, for reductio, that p / ∈ ∆. As a consequence we also know that ϕ / ∈ Γ and thus Γ σ = {p} q = ϕ σ , which implies that L is trivial and leads to a contradiction.
Hilbert calculi
A Hilbert calculus is a pair H = Σ, R where Σ is a signature, and R ⊆ 2 LΣ(P ) × L Σ (P ) is a set of inference rules. Given ∆, ψ ∈ R, we refer to ∆ as the set of premises and to ψ as the conclusion of the rule. When the set of premises is empty, ψ is dubbed an axiom. A rule is said to be finitary if it has a finite set of premises, and H is said to be finitary of all the rules in R are finitary. An inference rule ∆, ψ ∈ R is often denoted by ∆ ψ , or simply by
is the least set that contains Γ and is closed for all applications of instances of the inference rules in R, that is, if
H . The definition of L H above is arguably too abstract, as it does not highlight the sequence of rule applications that leads one to conclude that Γ H ϕ, when that is the case. Let us be more detailed. Given Σ ⊆ Σ , P ⊆ P , and Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ), a H -derivation from Γ is a sequence ϕ = ϕ κ κ<η of formulas in L Σ (P ), for some ordinal η, such that, for each κ < η, either ϕ κ ∈ Γ, or there is ∆ ψ ∈ R and σ : P → L Σ (P ) with ψ σ = ϕ κ and ∆ σ ⊆ {ϕ τ : τ < κ}.
The fact that ϕ is a H -derivation from Γ is denoted by Γ H ϕ. We say that such a derivation is a H -proof from Γ of each of its formulas, as it is clear that any prefix of a H -derivation from Γ is also a H -derivation from Γ.
Clearly, Γ H ϕ precisely if ϕ has a H -proof from Γ, that is, there exists some H -derivation ϕ κ κ<η from Γ such that ϕ = ϕ κ for some κ < η. Of course, in that case, ϕ ι ι<κ+1 is a H -proof of ϕ from Γ ending in ϕ.
When the Hilbert system is identified with a subscript H = H sub we drop the H in H sub and write just sub . Example 2.2. Along the paper, in order to illustrate the problems at hand and the results obtained we will use the following collection of examples:
• H inc(Σ) = Σ, R inc , for each signature Σ, where R inc has the unique rule p .
• H tonk = Σ tonk , R tonk , where Σ tonk has a unique 2-place connective tonk, and R tonk has the rules
q .
• H cls = Σ cls , R cls , where Σ cls has a unique 2-place connective ⇒, and R cls has the rules
• H int = Σ int , R int , where Σ int has a unique 2-place connective →, and R int has the rules
• H qcls = Σ qcls , R qcls , where Σ qcls = Σ cls and R qcls has the rules
• H top = Σ top , R top , where Σ top has a unique 0-place connective , and R top has the unique rule .
• H neg = Σ neg , R neg , where Σ neg has a unique 1-place connective ¬, and R neg has the rules p ¬¬p ¬¬p p p ¬p q .
• H cnj = Σ cnj , R cnj , where Σ cnj has a unique 2-place connective ∧, and R cnj has the rules p ∧ q p p ∧p q p ∧ q .
• H djn = Σ djn , R djn , where Σ djn has a unique 2-place connective ∨, and R djn has the rules
Clearly, each H inc(Σ) induces an inconsistent logic, whereas H tonk is Prior's infamous tonk system and induces a consistent but trivial logic. The calculi H cls and H int induce the logics of classical implication and intuitionistic implication, respectively. On the other hand, H qcls induces the logic of classical implication, but without theorems, and we dub it quasi-classical. Finally, H top induces the logic of (classical or intuitionistic) top (verum), H neg the logic of (classical or intuitionistic) negation, H cnj the logic of (classical or intuitionistic) conjunction and H djn the logic of (classical or intuitionistic) disjunction. Note that with the possible exception of the H inc(Σ) calculi, all other examples have very simple signatures with a single connective. This is a deliberate choice meant to keep the focus of attention on the relevant problems ahead, and not on the relative complexity of the syntax.
All the systems introduced in Example 2.2 are well known, with the possible exception of H djn . By reading [5] one may even be led to believe that classical disjunction does not have a finite axiomatization. However, Rautenberg proves in [18] that the axiomatization shown above is complete.
Given a logic L = Σ, , we can easily associate with it a Hilbert calculus H L = Σ, , where the consequence operator in the former is replaced by the induced consequence relation in the latter. It is easy to check that L H L = L (see [24] , for instance). For simplicity, we will use L name to denote the logic L Hname , namely for the calculi named in Example 2.2.
Fibring
A direct characterization of this fibred logic can be most easily given by first defining the fibring of Hilbert calculi.
Given Hilbert calculi H 1 = Σ 1 , R 1 and H 2 = Σ 2 , R 2 let their fibring be the Hilbert calculus
Clearly, besides joining the given signatures, which will allow us to build socalled mixed formulas, the fibring of the two calculi consists in simply putting together their rules, thus allowing a form of mixed reasoning.
We can now give a simple characterization of the fibring of two logics L 1 and
is obtained by a (possibly transfinite) sequence of alternate applications of 1 and 2 using substitutions σ : P → L Σ12 (P ).
Both for logics and Hilbert calculi, when there are no shared connectives, i.e. Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, the fibring is usually said to be disjoint.
Mixed reasoning
In this section we will introduce a number of useful notions and notations that allow us to breakdown the possibly interleaved syntax of mixed formulas, and then use them to give a thorough description of consequences of non-mixed hypotheses in disjoint fibring in terms of (any)one of the component logics, by suitably encoding the necessary interaction with the other component.
Monoliths and skeletons
Let Σ ⊆ Σ be signatures. We shall call a Σ-monolith of ψ ∈ L Σ (P ) to any outermost subformula of ψ whose head is in Σ \ Σ. The set Mon Σ (ψ) of all Σ-monoliths of ψ is defined as follows:
We extend the notation also to sets of formulas, using Mon Σ (∆) to denote
We shall now consider a reasonable way of defining the perspective, from the point of view of Σ, that one may have of a formula in L Σ (P ). For the purpose, we use a denumerable set X = {x ψ : ψ ∈ L Σ (P )} of additional propositional variables, disjoint from P . We define the function skel Σ :
as follows:
We call skel Σ (ψ) the Σ-skeleton of ψ. Clearly, skel Σ (ψ) is obtained from ψ by substituting each of its Σ-monoliths φ by the variable x φ .
Given two η-sequences α and β of L Σ (P ) formulas, with α injective, we write ψ[α/β] Σ to denote the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of α i as a Σ-monolith of ψ by β i , for all i < η. It is not difficult to check that
σ where σ is a substitution σ : P ∪ X → L Σ (P ) such that σ(x αi ) = β i for all i < η and σ(y) = y for y ∈ P ∪ (X \ {x αi : i < η}). This square bracket notation extends to sets of formulas in the obvious manner.
Example 3.1. Let Σ be the signature with exactly two connectives, a 0-place connective c and a 2-place connective g, that is,
Note, in particular, that the subformula f (c) is not a Σ-monolith of ψ because if occurs inside the (outermost) monolith
noting that β only replaces the leftmost occurrence of f (p) in ψ, where it is a Σ-monolith, leaving the second untouched.
We close this section with a simple result, that we borrow from [16] . We include also its proof since it is quite small but may help the reader to understand what is happening and hopefully work as a warm up for what comes next.
and every two η-sequences α and β of formulas in L Σ (P ), with α injective, there exists ρ : P → L Σ (P ) such that
Proof. One should observe, to start with, that Mon Σ (Γ) = ∅. Thus, if α κ ∈ Mon Σ (ϕ σ ) for some ϕ ∈ Γ, then there must exist a variable p ∈ P occurring in ϕ such that α κ ∈ Mon Σ (σ(p)). Hence, the substitution defined by ρ(q) = σ(q)[α/β] Σ for every q ∈ P satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Note that the lemma reflects the fact that the occurrence of Σ-monoliths in instances of L Σ (P ) formulas is only possible if they are brought about by the substitution. As a corollary, we obtain the following result.
Consider any injective sequence α of formulas in M , where every formula in M appears (exactly once), and define β to be the same length sequence such that each
The statement follows simply by applying Lemma 3.2 to Γ ∪ {ψ}, α and β, and then the structurality of under the resulting substitution ρ.
The fact that skel Σ (∆) skel Σ (ϕ) implies ∆ ϕ follows easily from the structurality of by considering a substitution σ : P ∪ X → L Σ (P ) such that σ(p) = p for p ∈ P , and σ(x ψ ) = ψ.
Consequences of non-mixed formulas
Let us now have a technical look at the patterns of mixed reasoning that occur in fibred logics, when starting with sets of non-mixed hypotheses. Consider the following example showing the irrelevance of certain monoliths in derivations from non-mixed formulas in logics obtained by disjoint fibring.
Clearly, p ψ i i<6 . We shall see that in this proof, from the point of view of Σ cls , the Σ cls -monoliths ¬¬(q → p) and ¬t have different roles and relevance.
It is not hard to check that if we substitute all the occurrences of ¬t with any other formula β, we still obtain a proof in L cls • L neg from p. Letting
and it is still the case that p ψ i i<6 . The same does not happen in general with ¬¬(q → p). For instance, taking β = r ∈ P \ {p} and
but p ψ i i<6 as ψ 3 = r is not an hypothesis, and also cannot be justified by any rule applied to the previous formulas.
These examples show that if a formula appears in a proof, we cannot hope in general to be able to replace its occurrences as a monolith by any other formula along the proof. They also suggest that this may be possible with formulas that do not occur in the proof sequence. Namely, note that ¬t / ∈ {ψ i : i < 6} but ¬¬(q → p) = ψ 3 .
In the next lemma we shall prove, as hinted by Example 3.4, that monoliths not appearing in a proof sequence are indeed irrelevant in that proof, and thus can be safely replaced. Note that the disjointness of the signatures is instrumental in proving this result. The lemma extends a similar result obtained in [16] , where it was obtained only for the case Γ ⊆ P .
, and ψ = ψ κ κ<η a sequence of L Σ12 (P ) formulas. If Γ 12 ψ and α ∈ L Σ12 (P ), then we have that either
• α = ψ κ for some κ < η, or
Proof. Let us assume that α = ψ κ for every κ < η. The proof of the second condition follows by complete transfinite induction on the size η of the derivation. For each ι < τ ≤ η, we assume, by induction hypothesis, that Γ 12 ψ κ [α/β] Σi κ<ι , and show that it implies Γ 12 ψ κ [α/β] Σi κ<τ , with i ∈ {1, 2}.
If τ = 0 the result is trivial, as the derivation is empty. If τ is a limit ordinal the result is immediate, by definition of derivation. If τ is a successor ordinal, we have to consider two cases.
, and therefore
By induction hypothesis we have that Γ 12 ψ κ [α/β] Σi κ<τ −1 and so, by definition of derivation, we also have
Here we have two possibilities, given that i ∈ {1, 2}.
, σ, α and β, we know that there exists ρ such that
By assumption the former cannot be the case, therefore we must have head(δ σ ) ∈ Σ i , and consequently δ ∈ P . Consider the substitution defined by ρ(q) = σ(q)[α/β] Σi for every q ∈ P . Clearly, as above, Having in mind our key result, the following definition is in hand, with the purpose of using the variables in X to represent contextual information regarding the alternation between uses of 1 and 2 in 12 -derivations. For convenience, below, we work with X * = {x * } ∪ X, where the extra variable x * will be used to represent in 1 some generic provable formula in 2 , or vice-versa.
where
We also define
Although the definition of Γ ω may seem involved, it is worth noting that in the non-mixed case, when Γ ⊆ L Σ1 (P ) ∪ L Σ2 (P ), it will follow, as we show below, that Γ ω = {p ∈ var(Γ) : Γ 12 p}.
The following lemma tells us that the number of iterations needed to calculate Γ ω is bounded by the cardinality of the set var(Γ), being of course finite when Γ is finite. Furthermore, the result justifies the ω bound in the definition, since we are assuming that P is denumerable.
Proof. The result follows easily from the fact that | var(Γ)| ≤ ω by observing, for all n ∈ N 0 , that Γ n+1 \ Γ n ⊆ var(Γ), and also that if
, it is easy to check that the corresponding fibred logic, induced by the Hilbert calculus H cnj •H tonk , is trivial. Therefore, the following equalities hold.
It is worth noting that while the first three + examples, corresponding to the fibred logic H cnj • H tonk can be obtained in just one iteration, the last example, concerning H cnj • H cls , needs two iterations. Indeed, the modus ponens rule of H cls can only be used after obtaining p (and also q) from p ∧ q in H cnj .
The following lemma uses the newly introduced notions and provides sufficient conditions for a consequence from non-mixed hypotheses to hold in a logic obtained by (disjoint) fibring.
Lemma 3.9. Let H 1 = Σ 1 , R 1 and H 2 = Σ 2 , R 2 be Hilbert calculi such that From Lemma 3.9, we know that Γ 12 ψ whenever we prove that either
Below, this implication is strengthened to an equivalence. This means that given a proof Γ 12 ψ, there is a proof of
In the next example we give some intuition on why this is the case.
Example 3.10. Take the fibred logic L cnj •L djn = Σ cnj ∪ Σ djn , , and consider Γ = {p ∧ q} and ψ = (p ∨ t 1 ) ∧ (q ∨ t 2 ). It is clear that Γ ψ, as the following inferences hold in the component logics:
It is worth noting that the interaction between the component logics is guided by the subformulas of Γ and ψ that are derived in one component logic and then used in the other, and that this effect is cumulative. Indeed, it follows on the side of L cnj that p and q are derivable form Γ, which is captured in the construction of Γ + = {x * , p ∧ q, p, q}. Then, this fact is used on the L djnside to build p ∨ t 1 and q ∨ t 2 , which is captured by X cnj Γ (ψ) = {x p∨t1 , x q∨t2 }. Finally, with these formulas we can build ψ on the L cnj -side. In other words,
The characterization
Before we state and prove our main characterization result, we need an additional lemma showing that one can always work under the assumption that there is a fresh variable in P .
Lemma 3.11. Let p 0 , p 1 , . . . ∈ P be an enumeration of P and nxt : P → L Σ (P ) be such that nxt(p k ) = p k+1 . The following facts hold, for i ∈ {1, 2}:
Proof. The first statement follows simply from the structurality of 12 .
In order to prove the last two statements, let us consider the substitution
Concerning the second statement, if
prv , by just using the structurality of i . As prv • nxt is the identity on P , using now the structurality of 12 , we have that
Concerning the third statement, let us further consider the substitution nxt :
Clearly, nxt is a completion of nxt such that prv • nxt is the identity on P ∪ X * . Let us assume that (Γ nxt ) + is i -explosive. In order to show that Γ + i ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ L Σ12 (P ∪X * ), it suffices to note that (Γ nxt ) + i ϕ nxt and by structurality
The proof is concluded by reusing the argument used in the proof of the second statement.
We can finally tackle our key characterization result, relating proofs from non-mixed hypotheses in disjoint fibrings with proofs in one of the component logics, by incorporating the derivable subformulas emerging from interaction with the other component.
Then, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j, Γ 12 ψ if and only if
Proof. The bottom to top implication follows by Lemma 3.9.
Let us now consider the top to bottom implication, and assume that we have Γ 12 ψ. We will work under the assumption that p 0 / ∈ var(Γ) (this is crucial in the proof of subcase (2)(b), below). Lemma 3.11 allows us to make this assumption without any loss of generality. Indeed, from Γ 12 ψ we know that Γ nxt 12 ψ nxt while being sure that p 0 / ∈ var(Γ nxt ). From here, our proof below will guarantee that (
+ is jexplosive, and the lemma allows us to conclude that
Clearly, Γ 12 = ∅ and so x * ∈ Γ + . If Γ + is j -explosive the statement immediately follows. Hence, we proceed assuming that we have Γ + is not jexplosive. Let H 12 = H 1 • H 2 . The proof follows by complete transfinite induction on the length of H 12 -derivations. Given that Γ 12 ψ, there must exist a H 12 -derivation ψ = ψ κ κ<η+1 from Γ such that ψ η = ψ. We want to show that
Thus, we will prove that Γ + , X i Γ (ψ τ ) i skel Σi (ψ τ ) for any τ ≤ η assuming, by induction hypothesis, that the top to bottom implication holds for any H 12 -derivation with length smaller than τ , and for both i = 1, 2.
Note that the case when head(ψ τ ) ∈ Σ j is trivial. Indeed, in that situation, we have that Mon Σi (ψ τ ) = {ψ τ }, and thus
We assume, henceforth, that either ψ τ ∈ P or head(ψ τ ) ∈ Σ i , meaning that skel Σj (ψ τ ) ∈ P ∪ X.
We have to consider two cases.
(1) ψ τ ∈ Γ.
In this case,
, and we are working under the assumption that
(2) ψ τ = ϕ σ , ∆ ϕ ∈ R t for some t ∈ {1, 2}, and ∆ σ ⊆ {ψ κ : κ < τ }.
Since {ψ κ : κ < τ } t ψ τ , by applying Corollary 3.3 we obtain that {skel Σt (ψ κ ) : κ < τ } t skel Σt (ψ τ ). By induction hypothesis we then have that Γ + , X t Γ (ψ κ ) t skel Σt (ψ κ ) for each κ < τ , and therefore, we have that
Now we consider two possibilities.
(a) ∆ ϕ ∈ R i , and so t = i.
, and µ(y) = y otherwise. We have
. By structurality and monotonicity we get
∆ ϕ ∈ R j , and so t = j. If ψ κ = ψ τ for some κ < τ , by induction hypothesis we have that
. We finish the proof by showing that no other case is possible. That is, assuming that either ψ τ ∈ P \ Γ + or head(ψ τ ) ∈ Σ i , along with the fact that ψ κ = ψ τ for all κ < τ , we will derive a contradiction.
Consider ν : P ∪ X * → L Σ12 (P ∪ X * ) such that ν(x) = x * for all x ∈ X * , and ν(q) = q for all q ∈ P . Clearly (Γ
ν ⊆ {x * } ⊆ Γ + and ν(ψ τ ) = ν(p) = p. Therefore, using the structurality of j , we get Γ + j p. Here we have to split the proof in yet another two cases.
· If p /
∈ var(Γ + ) then, by structurality of j , we easily conclude that Γ + is j -explosive, which is a contradiction. · If p ∈ var(Γ + ) then Γ = ∅. Let γ ∈ Γ and consider a substitution ρ such that τ (q) = q for q ∈ P and ρ(x * ) = γ. By structurality of j we get (
(ii) head(ψ τ ) ∈ Σ i . Recall that we are assuming that p 0 / ∈ var(Γ). We define, for all
defined by µ(x ψτ ) = p 0 , and µ(y) = y for y = x ψτ . Easily, we have that skel Σj (ψ κ ) = (skel Σj (ψ κ )) µ for all κ ≤ τ . Since {skel Σj (ψ κ ) : κ < τ } j skel Σj (ψ τ ), by structurality of j we obtain that ({skel Σj (ψ κ ) : κ < τ }) µ j (x ψτ ) µ and therefore, {skel Σj (ψ κ ) : κ < τ } j p 0 .
As Γ 12 ψ κ κ<τ and we assumed that ψ κ = ψ τ for all κ < τ , we can use Lemma 3.5 to conclude that Γ 12 ψ κ κ<τ , and by induction hypothesis, we get that Γ + , X j Γ (ψ κ ) j skel Σj (ψ κ ) for each κ < τ . Thus, we also have Γ + , κ<τ X j Γ (ψ κ ) j p 0 . Using the substitution ν as defined in (i), and arguing in the same manner, we obtain a contradiction.
In the next example we highlight the relevance of each element of the construction in the previous proposition. 
We have that Γ ψ k k<8 , and in particular Γ ψ 7 , because ψ 0 , ψ 2 appear as hypothesis in Γ, ψ 1 , ψ 3 , ψ 5 appear by application of rules of H neg , and ψ 4 , ψ 6 , ψ 7 appear by application of rules of H cnj .
Note that Γ + = {¬¬p, q, p, x * }. It is clear that Γ + is not cnj -explosive nor neg -explosive, as both L cnj and L neg are fragments of classical logic. We shall see that we can extract from the above derivation two derivations justifying
, respectively. In this case, as head(ψ 7 ) ∈ Σ cnj , the derivation on the L cnj side will be much more informative than the derivation on the L neg side.
Indeed, if we consider L neg , we get X neg Γ (ψ 7 ) = {x ψ7 } and skel Σneg (ψ 7 ) = x ψ7 , and we trivially have Γ + , X neg Γ (ψ 7 ) neg skel Σneg (ψ 7 ) -the derivation only retains the (skel Σneg of the) last step of the original sequence.
It is more interesting to consider L cnj . Easily, we have that X cnj Γ (ψ 7 ) = {x ψ0 , x ψ5 } and skel Σ cnj (ψ 7 ) = x ψ5 ∧ (x ψ0 ∧ q). Using the same rules justifying ψ 6 and ψ 7 in the original derivation, we easily see that q, x ψ0 , x ψ5 cls x ψ5 ∧(x ψ0 ∧q). Note that the other step of the original derivation that was justified on the L cnj side, ψ 4 , is simply not necessary here as it is "obscured" by double-negation in ψ 5 .
In the case above, x * ∈ Γ + did not play a significant role. In order to clarify the importance of x * , let us now consider the fibred logic L qcls • L top = Σ, , where Σ = Σ qcls ∪ Σ top . In Example 4.1, we saw that although qcls p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) we have that p ⇒ (q ⇒ p). Indeed, , p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) is a valid derivation:
appears as an axiom of L top , and p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) as an application of the corresponding L qcls rule. In this case ∅ + = {x * }, and it is clear that {x * } is neither qcls -explosive, nor top -explosive.
Focusing on the L qcls side, to derive skel Σ qcls (p ⇒ (q ⇒ p)) = p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) we need to have some initial formula. Note also that X qcls ∅ (p ⇒ (q ⇒ p)) = ∅. However, as x * qcls p ⇒ (q ⇒ p), we have ∅ + qcls p ⇒ (q ⇒ p).
Conservativity
In this section we tackle the first of two meaningful applications of Proposition 3.12. Namely, we use it to close, in the disjoint case, a long standing question of the theory of fibring: conservativity. Namely, we prove a full conservativity characterization result for disjoint fibring, extending the partial result obtained in [19] . We start by reviewing the conservativity problem for fibring, by means of a series of examples.
The problem
Example 4.1. Let H 1 = Σ, R be any Hilbert calculus with a (useful) rule Γ ϕ ∈ R such that ϕ / ∈ Γ, and H 2 = Σ, ∅ . It is easy to check that L H1 • L H2 = L H1 and thus it does not extend L H2 conservatively. Namely, it is clear that
This is not surprising as one might argue that the two logics share some syntax, as they even have the same signature, but their consequences do not agree on all shared formulas. Though the argument is correct, this intuition is still misleading. In fact, the simplest way to avoid such a clash would be to require that the fibring be disjoint. However, one can easily show that even disjoint fibring can lead to situations where conservativity fails.
Let us consider the logics L qcls = Σ qcls , qcls and L top = Σ top , top from Example 2.2. Clearly,
does not extend L qcls conservatively. Namely, note that
Indeed, it suffices to note that top implies , s qcls p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) implies p ⇒ (q ⇒ p) using structurality, and thus p ⇒ (q ⇒ p).
These examples show us that although the conservativity problem for fibring is clearly more troublesome when there are shared connectives, there is still something fundamental that needs to be better understood at the simpler level of disjoint fibring. This is precisely where Proposition 3.12 may be of help. Let us analyze a few more disjoint examples. 
However, though necessary, the triviality of L 2 may not be sufficient. Take, for instance, L 1 = L inc(Σ) and L 2 = L tonk for any signature Σ such that tonk / ∈ Σ, as defined in Example 2.2. Both logics are obviously trivial, but
The examples above emphasize the impact that triviality and inconsistency have on the conservativity problem. However, getting rid of such pathological cases is still not completely satisfactory, as the next examples will help illustrate. [7] , and also as a consequence of [19] .
However, let us consider a small variation, and take the logic L qcls instead of
is not conservative anymore. Namely, the extension of L qcls by L qcls • L int is not conservative, as it happens that
Indeed, similarly to Example 4.1, it suffices to note that
using structurality, and thus p ⇒ (q ⇒ p).
At this point one might still argue that the failure identified above has to do with the fact that the logic L qcls is somewhat artificial. We show below that such a consideration, though reasonable, is not fundamental. However, let us consider now the logic L neg = Σ neg , neg from Example 2.2. It turns out that L qcls • L neg is a conservative extension of both L qcls and L neg , as we will show below.
Characterization
Our main result about conservativity of disjoint fibring follows.
Theorem 4.5. Let H 1 = Σ 1 , R 1 and H 2 = Σ 2 , R 2 be two Hilbert calculi, with Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, and i, j ∈ {1, 2} such that i = j.
Then, L H1 • L H2 is a conservative extension of L Hi if and only if the following two properties are satisfied:
• if L Hj is trivial then L Hi is trivial, and
• if L Hj has theorems then L Hi does not have q-theorems.
Proof. Let us first prove that the two conditions are necessary. Assume that indeed L H1 • L H2 is a conservative extension of L Hi . If L Hj is trivial then p j q for any distinct p, q ∈ P , which implies that p 12 q, and in turn, by the conservativeness assumption, also implies that p i q, and we conclude that L Hi is trivial.
If L Hj has a theorem, say ϕ ∈ L Σj (P ), then j ϕ, which implies that 12 ϕ. Suppose, for reductio, that L Hi has a q-theorem ψ ∈ L Σi (P ). Pick p ∈ P such that p does not occur in ψ. As ψ is a q-theorem of L Hi , we have that p i ψ, which on its turn implies that p 12 ψ. Consider the substitution σ : P → L Σ12 (P ) defined by σ(p) = ϕ, and σ(q) = q for q = p. Easily, p σ = ϕ and ψ σ = ψ, and by structurality we get that ϕ 12 ψ. But we already know that 12 ϕ, and therefore we get 12 ψ. As we assumed that L H1 • L H2 is a conservative extension of L Hi , we get i ψ, which contradicts the fact that ψ is a q-theorem of L Hi . We conclude that L Hi does not have q-theorems.
We are now left with proving that the two conditions are sufficient for guaranteeing that L H1 • L H2 is a conservative extension of L Hi . Assume that both conditions hold, and let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L Σi (P ) be such that Γ 12 ϕ. If L Hj is trivial then, by assumption, L Hi is also trivial. There are two possibilities for a trivial logic: either all formulas are theorems of L Hi , or all formulas are q-theorems of L Hi . In the former case, ϕ is a theorem and thus Γ i ϕ. In the latter case, ϕ is a q-theorem and thus Γ i ϕ if Γ = ∅. We just need to show here that the case Γ = ∅ is impossible. Suppose, for reductio, that L Hi is trivial and has q-theorems, but Γ = ∅. As 12 ϕ but L Hi has no theorems, it must be the case that L Hj has theorems. Then, by assumption, it follows that L Hi has no q-theorems, which contradicts the hypothesis.
If L Hj is not trivial then, by Lemma 2.1, as Γ ⊆ L Σi (P ), we can easily conclude that Γ + is not j -explosive. Thus, we can apply Proposition 3.12 to Γ 12 ϕ and conclude that
Moreover, we know that ϕ ∈ Γ 12 = ∅ and thus x * ∈ Γ + . Hence, we have
It is also easy to see that in this case Γ ω ⊆ Γ i . Let us prove by induction on n ∈ N that Γ n ⊆ Γ i . The base case is straightforward. If n = k + 1 then by induction hypothesis, Γ n ⊆ Γ i , and to finish the proof if suffices to show that {p ∈ var(Γ) : Γ n j p} ⊆ Γ n , which follows easily from the fact that Γ n ⊆ L Σi (P ) by using Lemma 2.1 and the non-triviality of j . Hence we conclude that Γ, x * i ϕ.
If Γ i ψ for some ψ ∈ L Σi (P ), just consider a substitution σ : P ∪ X * → L Σi (P ) such that σ(p) = p if p ∈ P , and σ(x * ) = ψ. Clearly, Γ σ = Γ, ϕ σ = ϕ and x σ * = ψ, and from Γ, x * i ϕ, by structurality, we get Γ, ψ i ϕ. As we assumed that Γ i ψ, we conclude that Γ i ϕ.
If there is no ψ ∈ L Σi (P ) such that Γ i ψ, then we know not only that Γ = ∅ but also that L Hi has no theorems. In that case, as we have 12 ϕ, we also know that the fibred logic has theorems, and therefore L Hj must have theorems. Thus, by assumption, we also know that L Hi does not have q-theorems. At this point, as we have that x * i ϕ, x * does not occur in ϕ, and ϕ cannot be a q-theorem, we can conclude that ϕ is a theorem and thus i ϕ.
thms q-thms thms q-thms none Our characterization of the conservativity problem for disjoint fibring is synthesized in the table of Figure 1 , where we equate all the possible combinations of the relevant property of triviality with the existence of theorems (thms) and q-theorems (q-thms) for each of the component logics. The symbol i ∈ {1, 2} appears in the table entries corresponding exactly to the combinations in which L i is extended conservatively. Example 4.2 illustrates the combinations in the two leftmost columns of the table, when the first logic is trivial. Example 4.3 illustrates the third line entries, in the third and fourth columns, when fibring a non-trivial logic with theorems and another non-trivial logic with theorems or q-theorems. Example 4.4 exemplifies the penultimate entry of the last line of the table, when fibring two non-trivial logics, one with q-theorems, the other with neither theorems nor q-theorems. The remaining situations, (1) when one combines two non-trivial logics both with quasi-theorems, and (2) when one combines a nontrivial logic without quasi-theorems and a non-trivial logic without theorems nor quasi-theorems, always lead to a conservative extension, and can be easily illustrated. For case (1) , it would suffice to consider the fibring of L qcls with a similarly obtainable theoremless version of L int . For case (2) , one might consider
It is also worth noting that the conservativity result for disjoint fibring provided by [19] covers only four entries in our table, which we marked with , corresponding to the combination of two non-trivial logics without quasi-theorems.
Indeed, the author of [19] considers only what he calls fully determined logics: logics that are determined by a class of matrices having as designated values a non-empty proper subset of the carrier. These are shown to correspond to nontrivial logics having no mere-followers, or quasi-theorems in our terminology. Another advantage of our result is that it allows a finer analysis of the conservativity problem, as it also describes the cases where only one of the component logics is conservatively extended by the fibred logic.
A peek over the semantical side of fibring
As a further illustration of the power of Proposition 3.12, which goes well beyond conservativity, we consider a second interesting application. Namely, we show that finite-(N)valuedness is not preserved by fibring, in general.
As we already mentioned, there have been various attempts to provide fibring with an appropriate semantical counterpart. Despite some interesting results, like sufficient conditions for completeness preservation, these attempts are not fully satisfactory and, in particular, have reduced practical use. Our result helps to justify why this is the case, namely using the widely accepted notion of matrix semantics [24] or, even more generally, of non-deterministic matrix semantics [1] , which we recall. • A is a non-empty set (of truth-values),
• D ⊆ A (the set of designated truth-vales), and
If for every n ∈ N 0 , c ∈ Σ (n) and a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A, we have thatc(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a singleton, then M is simply said to be a (deterministic) matrix.
for every n ∈ N 0 , c ∈ Σ (n) and ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ L Σ (P ). Of course, when M is deterministic, a valuation v is determined by the values of v(p) for p ∈ P .
We say that M, v |= ϕ if v(ϕ) ∈ D, and M, v |= Γ if M, v |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ. Moreover, we say that Γ |= M ϕ if for all valuations v over M , M, v |= Γ implies M, v |= ϕ. Given a class M of (N)matrices for Σ, we say that Γ |= M ϕ if Γ |= M ϕ for every M ∈ M. It is straightforward to check that |= M is always a Tarskian consequence relation.
If L = Σ, is a logic, we say that (the semantics) M is L-sound if
we also say that M is a characteristic (N)matrix for L, and if M is finite we say that L is finite-(N)valued.
It is well known that every Tarskian consequence relation can be given a semantics based on logical matrices, and thus also on Nmatrices. Characteristic (N)matrices, however, do not exist in general. See [24, 1] for a discussion of these questions.
The main result in this section is that an important aspect of many familiar logics, the existence of a finite characteristic (N)matrix, is not preserved by (disjoint) fibring. For this purpose we present examples where the preservation of this property fails. We consider pairs of logics having simple finite characteristic matrices, and prove that their fibring is not characterizable by a single finite (N)matrix, profitting from Proposition 3.12 as follows: given logics
and a formula ϕ k ∈ L Σ1∪Σ2 (P ); making make use of Proposition 3.12 we prove that Γ k 12 ϕ k ; finally, using the pigeonhole principle, we conclude that each L 12 -sound Nmatrix M with less than k elements is such that
We consider the fragments of classical logic L djn and L neg , each characterized by the matrix based on the corresponding restriction of the 2-valued Boolean algebra, and prove that their fibring is not characterizable by a single finite Nmatrix
For each k ∈ N, consider:
We start by proving that Γ k ϕ k , for any k ∈ N. For the purpose, we will take advantage of Proposition 3.12.
We first show that
, we use the 2-valued characteristic matrix for classical disjunction, and consider a valuation v : P → {0, 1} such that v(p j ) = 1 for j = i and v(p i ) = 0, which clearly satisfies Γ k but not p i .
To check that Γ k neg p i , we can apply Corollary 3.3, and show instead that skel Σneg (Γ k ) neg skel Σ cnj (p i ), that is, {x pi∨pj : 0 ≤ i < j ≤ k} neg p i . As above, we use the 2-valued characteristic matrix for classical negation, and consider a valuation v : P ∪ X → {0, 1} such that v(p i ) = 0 and v(y) = 1 for all y = p i , which clearly does the job. Now, it follows easily from the above that (Γ k ) + is not neg -explosive nor djn -explosive. Using Proposition 3.12 it now suffices to show that
, as φ neg ¬¬φ and ¬¬φ neg φ. Thus, we need to show that Γ k p i ∨ p k+1 for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k. We use again Proposition 3.12, which, together with the fact that (Γ k )
+ is not neg -explosive, reduces our problem to checking that
Hence, we just need to prove that (Γ k ) + djn p i ∨ p k+1 . Again, as above, we can just consider a valuation v : P ∪ X → {0, 1} such that v(p k+1 ) = v(p i ) = 0, and v(y) = 1 for all y = p i and y = p k+1 , over the 2-valued characteristic matrix for classical disjunction.
We are left with showing that
Again, we can just consider a valuation v : P ∪ X → {0, 1} such that v(x * ) = v(p i ) = 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and v(x φ ) = 0 for all x φ ∈ X, over the 2-valued characteristic matrix for classical disjunction.
At last, we show that for every 
since M is sound and q neg ¬¬q.
By the pigeonhole principle we know that v(
We conclude that v(ϕ k ) ∈ D, again using (b), and hence that Γ k |= M ϕ k .
As a corollary, we immediately get that finite-Nvaluedness is not preserved by fibring. Recently, in [15] , Humberstone analyzed the logic L djn •L cnj , and proved that it is not finite-valued. In order to prove this, the author shows, with the help of a clever translation to modal logic K4!, that the logic has infinitely many nonequivalent formulas in a single propositional variable. As a further application, we shall also consider L djn • L cnj and further prove, using the general recipe introduced and exemplified above, that this logic is also not characterizable by a finite Nmatrix. As every matrix is also an Nmatrix, our result implies that of Humberstone, but not the other way around. As a matter of fact, Humberstone's method cannot be used to prove this stronger result. Indeed, it is straightforward to define a simple finite Nmatrix generating a logic with infinitely many non-equivalent formulas in a single propositional variable.
and, for each k ∈ N, consider:
We start by proving that Γ k ϕ k 2 , for any k ∈ N, by taking advantage of Proposition 3.12.
, we can resort to the 2-element characteristic matrix for classical disjunction, and consider a valuation v : P → {0, 1} such that v(p j ) = 1 for j = i and v(p i ) = 0, which clearly satisfies Γ k but not p i .
To check that Γ k cnj p i , as Γ k L Σ cnj (P ), we can apply Corollary 3.3, and prove instead that skel Σ cnj (Γ k ) cnj skel Σ cnj (p i ), that is, {p 0 } ∪ {x pi∨pj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k} cnj p i . As above, we resort to the 2-element characteristic matrix for classical conjunction, and consider a valuation v : P ∪ X → {0, 1} such that v(p i ) = 0, and v(y) = 1 for all y = p i , which clearly does the job. Now, it follows easily from the above that (Γ k ) + is not cnj -explosive nor djn -explosive. Using Proposition 3.12 it now suffices to show that
Let us show that X
In order to check that Γ k p 0 ∧ p i we will use again 2 Note that it immediately follows that, in L djn • L cnj , conjunction does not distribute over disjunction as usual in classical logic, i.e., for k > 1,
It suffices to observe that Γ k p 0 ∧ ( + is not djn -explosive reduces our problem to checking that Γ k , X cnj Γ k (p 0 ∧p i ) cnj skel Σ cnj (p 0 ∧p i ). Since p 0 ∧p i ∈ L Σ cnj (P ), we have that X cnj Γ k (p 0 ∧p i ) = ∅ and skel Σ cnj (p 0 ∧p i ) = p 0 ∧p i . As above, to check that Γ k cnj p 0 ∧p i , as Γ k L Σ cnj (P ), we can apply Corollary 3.3, and check instead that skel Σ cnj (Γ k ) cnj skel Σ cnj (p 0 ∧ p i ), that is, {p 0 } ∪ {x pi∨pj : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k} cnj p 0 ∧ p i .
Again, as above, we can just consider a valuation v : P ∪ X → {0, 1} such that v(p i ) = 0, and v(y) = 1 for all y = p i , over the 2-element characteristic matrix for classical conjunction.
We are left with showing that (Γ k )
+ , x * djn
Again, we use the 2-element characteristic matrix for classical disjunction, and consider a valuation v : P ∪ X * → {0, 1} such that v(y) = 1 if y ∈ P ∪ {x * }, and v(y) = 0 otherwise. we have that v(p i ) = v(p j ) for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, and from (a) we conclude that v(p i ) ∈ D for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore, using (b), we get v(ϕ k ) ∈ D and hence that Γ k |= M ψ n .
Conclusion
We gave a full characterization of the patterns of reasoning from non-mixed hypothesis in fibred logics without shared connectives, extending the result obtained in [16] . Though this extension may seem diminute, its interest is well justified by the new insights about fibred logics it allows and the scope of its consequences. Indeed, our new result is a great deal better in capturing the way the resulting logic emerges from its components, and its usefulness goes well beyond its previous version. Using the characterization obtained in this paper we could have easily extended the decidability preservation result of [16] from theoremhood to arbitrary reasoning from non-mixed hypothesis in logics obtained by disjoint fibring. Still, this would not be too interesting, as we discuss below. Instead, we explored other two meaningful applications which could not be tackled using the result in [16] .
To start with, we provided necessary and sufficient conditions for a disjointly fibred logic to be a conservative extension of its component logics. This result is the first full account of conservativity for disjoint fibring, and completes the partial answer to this problem given in [19] .
Further, we also illustrated the usefulness of our characterization of mixed reasoning in a completely different setting, namely in understanding the difficulties behind effectively describing fibred semantics in terms of the semantics of the component logics. Concretely, we have shown that the fibring of finite-(N)valued logics may result in logics that are not finitely-(N)valued.
There are two ways in which our main characterization result can possibly be strengthened.
The first possible extension would consist in admitting arbitrary sets of mixed hypotheses, instead of only non-mixed hypotheses, while keeping the disjointness requirement. Such an extension does not seem hopeless, and it should allow us to prove that disjoint fibring preserves decidability in general. The characterization result obtained in this paper already allows improving the decidability of theoremhood obtained in [16] , but we refrain from working out the details as we still fall short of a general decidability preservation result. We hope to report on this line of work in a forthcoming paper.
The latter possibility would be to go the full way, and allow the logics to share connectives. Such an extension of our characterization result seems to be very far from trivial, and is currently beyond the scope of our tools. Indeed, disjointness is a key ingredient of basic results like Lemma 3.5. Still, such an extension, even if not covering all the cases, would certainly provide us with a much deeper understanding of the fibring mechanism, and could potentially have a myriad of practical applications, including characterizations of conservativity and decidability also for logics sharing connectives, not to mention the added mastery of fibred semantics.
On the conservativity front, beyond the disjoint case, it is nevertheless clear that the problem can be explored even without such a powerful tool, at least to the point of establishing general enough sufficient conditions on the component logics to guarantee that they are conservatively extended by fibring. Further investigations are necessary, but we are working on such an approach by taking advantage of suitable translations between logics.
